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What Went Wrong at Hart Still an Open Question

After reading the conclusions of an informal audit - the William S. Hart Union High School District's side of the story of nearly 100-percent cost overruns at Arroyo Seco Junior High School - we can see there are more questions than answers.

While we know that what was supposed to cost $22.4 million is presently $43 million, we still don't know why; and no, it is not just because of some contractor's bankruptcy or the old reliable grab-bag answer of "inflation." Neither excuse passes muster - alone or combined.

The district's side says, "unfortunately, the contractor went into bankruptcy before placing the building ... the federal bankruptcy court voided the contract and any hope of recovery from surety bonds."

Both statements need further clarifications and, in particular, the latter statement is simply not so. The bankruptcy court does not have such authority.

Further, what does "placing the building" mean, and which contract is referenced - the one between the district and the contractor, or the bond contract between the contractor and the surety company?

-A (surety) bond is comprised of the principal (contractor), the obligee (district) and the surety (company). Are we being told that two sides made a final adjudication independently of the third, leaving the district a victim versus the financial recipient? That scenario should be true only if the bond were exonerated, and exoneration is usually only done by the surety because of contractor misrepresentations.

Did anyone on behalf of the district perform any due diligence on the now-defunct contractor? How can the public review the bonds precipitated for this project?

A "bond" is not the same as insurance. A bond is not always a "surety bond," and there are many kinds of surety bonds. Proper surety being held to its full responsibilities should have precluded the alleged domino effects of cost overruns reportedly attached to the lack of contractor performance.

The contractor's bankruptcy should not preclude surety bond guarantees; it should precipitate the guarantees for the project's owner not to suffer loss. That's the blueprint and intention of bonding.

After the contractor went belly-up, the bankruptcy court became its stead. If the surety bond were exonerated for any reason other than the aforementioned, who on behalf of the district agreed to it, like a settlement, and who gave the authorization to do that - something that is put in place to protect taxpayer money?

If the general contractor signed a contract for the entire $22.4 million, the bond probably cost taxpayers $224,000. Did we get any of that money back in trade for the surety being off of the hook?

There are additional issues of "pay" bond versus "performance" bond that also remain unexplained.

One example given by the district for the near doubling of the money spent was "unknown sewer and utility lines." Anyone who has done any type of significant home or property repairs or reconstruction can appreciate the unknown. Procuring existing line data from the city or county and the utility companies must be done as part of the construction documents, and those plans would be necessary to prepare a proper bid.

Are district personnel responsible for checking those documents for this component? If an outside entity gave inadequate or incorrect information, can or is the district pursuing them?

For the district to casually offer, through the informal audit, that aesthetic "enhancements" were made costing an extra $2.4 million is unsettling. It's hard to believe that seasoned construction personnel, evaluating this project, did not know they would be pressure-washing existing buildings to make them uniform with the new ones.

If the true cost of the project were mitigated on paper in order to procure at least some bond money and that process is an unwritten but acceptable practice, then taxpayers were hoodwinked. If the alternative is bad planning, then - either way, the public pays. Again.

This project has been called "complex." What is so complex about it? How is it more unusual than other school modernization and construction?

Two decades ago, the standard of acceptability for construction project overruns was about 5 percent. This was anticipated and accepted. Even allowing a 500-percent increase to 25 percent today takes us to the simple math of $5.6 million in overruns. Not 92 percent. Not $21 million.

The content of the "taxpayer-voter conditions of always requiring utilization of a low bid" language needs to be reviewed for its intent. Surely that "law" does not estop an entity, such as the district, from comparing bids and asking questions of all bidders. In other words, it would seem incumbent upon the entity to act prudently to obviate and avert inevitable problems, financial and otherwise. To preclude or exclude proper due diligence would be against the public's best interest, and if that's the case, we need new language.

Through all of the print about this specific issue, those responsible for the quagmire are not discernible. The district's board president offered one statement that the public's money has not been watched as it should have been.

That's an elephantine understatement. The all-encompassing statement is that the trust in those bearing the onus for the stewardship of the people's money has been seriously and continually breached. No remedies have been forthcoming but for an aside story of the early departure of Rory Livingston, the once-assistant superintendent of business - a departure that paid him $234,000.

We'll see if the upcoming $30,000 formal audit is just more numbers or real answers. Ninety-two percent cost overruns have not been explained. Definitely not.

Betty Arenson lives in Valencia. Her column reflects her own views, and not necessarily those of The Signal.

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Morris ID
Not a Morris ID. This record is keyed ts-ds:31994.
System
displaystory pages (?module=displaystory)
Reading copy
the-signal.com
Chosen by: latest capture. On this copy: words 938 (e-mail addresses counted as one token); reader comments 0 (counted, not reproduced here); images 0.
Extracted by
displaystory:print_view
signal-extract/0.15 (2026-11-16)

Other copies (1)

Host
the-signal.com
http://www.the-signal.com:80/?module=displaystory&story_id=31994&format=html
Captured24 August 2006, 00:43:48 UTC
CaptureThe archive does not serve this capture as a facsimile; the text is extracted from it.
SHA-2560805146cd566d01609b1ff0f327f21e421dec7cbfc634721379be8ebbbca75e6SHA-256 of the bytes the archive holds, recorded at intake. A SHA-1 of the same bytes, taken at the same time, equals the Wayback Machine’s own digest for this capture: M2KZBY75MTQY3Q4JK7TGJPHNB5ZGLBTC.
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How it was classified

Label
clearly-local
Judgment
A machine’s (recorded as machine), kept as one so it can be revisited.
Classifier
signal-localclass/0.7 (2026-11-12)
Local signals
  • text:valley_names [3 distinct/3 mentions: Valencia, William S. Hart, Hart Union]
  • byline:named_writer_no_wire_credit [Commentary by Betty Arenson]
National signals
none fired
Scores
local 4, national 0