Third and final installment of an "explainer" concerning the current mortgage crisis in the United States.
I enjoy the letters to the editor section of The Mighty Signal. It first amazes and delights me that so many citizens of the SCV can put together a cogent, lucid argument with proper sentence and paragraph structure and even correct punctuation.
Second, I enjoy letters that provide a point of view perhaps at odds with my own that can stimulate my thinking in a different direction. A recent letter by Linda Baldwin concerning current real estate matters did both.
I do not know Ms. Baldwin's educational background, but she discussed and exposited very clearly the free market concept of "moral hazard." This theory requires individuals and entities in a free market system to endure the full economic cost of their poor decisions. The reason? In any free market system asset values will first rise due to legitimate market forces, however, invariably investors and others will flock to the asset class and bid up prices (not values) based solely on the expectation of increased prices.
This creates so-called speculative bubbles that must invariably "burst" since they rely solely on people's "feelings," and when those feelings evaporate substantial price adjustments occur.
What does moral hazard accomplish? When people bear the brunt of their poor investment and purchase decisions fully, they will generally not repeat the same action in the future. Therefore, moral hazard tends to force bubbles lower over the long run, requiring less overall pain in the eventual adjustments.
But a hazard exists in the full implementation of moral hazard from the point of view of Ms. Baldwin. She feels that many subprime homeowners were nearly evil in their desire to own a home. I must confess. Our family held a subprime mortgage between 1990 and 1994, though we did not realize it at the time. We sought to purchase a home in Nebraska with a mortgage that our income would not support to make it a prime mortgage. Our friend at a local bank agreed to hold the mortgage in the bank's portfolio rather than requiring its sale to a quango. The mortgage carried adjustable rates that over the four years went up 2 percent (punishing), came back down 3 percent (like oxygen to a drowning man) and held steady. Our family income rose modestly, we never defaulted, and eventually we managed to sell the home for a modest gain when the family moved to Texas, and then owned a home in Texas and eventually purchased a home in California.
Our home ownership experience in California? Ms. Baldwin would count us a success story. Leaving aside appreciation, the income required to pay the principle and interest on our mortgage and real estate taxes (due to the deductibility of these items for federal and state income tax purposes) is one-third the amount we would need to earn to rent and occupy similar non-owned property, a nice income creation for our family.
So some subprime mortgage holders do pay their mortgages, eventually refinance into prime, and then become responsible homeowners. I agree with Ms. Baldwin regarding the appeal of punishing those who purchased homes with subprime loans at teaser rates, did a few cash out refinances to consume, and now face default and the loss of their residences. Unfortunately, as the Old Testament Psalmist stated. "the rain falls on both the righteous and the unrighteous."
An example? When we moved to California in 1996, the Antelope Valley continued to reel from the real estate collapse fueled by the defense industry realignment in the early '90s. Anecdotes abounded of squatters living in foreclosed tract homes abandoned by their former owners. Who received the most punishment for this? Not the displaced homeowners; long gone from the venue, but the remaining homeowners that responsibly paid their mortgages watching their neighborhood blighted by foreclosed properties and the value of their own cherished asset depleting.
What can the government and its quangos do? They can refinance those subprime homeowners that would otherwise qualify for mortgages but need relief from savagely adjusting teaser loans that require dire prepayment penalties. They can provide a market for "jumbo" mortgages from otherwise prime borrowers on which the private market recently turned twitchy. In other words, they can place a floor under the asset devaluation caused by supply/demand imbalance caused by so many homes coming onto the market too quickly in a non-orderly manner.
Will some undeserving homeowners receive a bailout? Yes. Will hedge fund investors who greedily snapped up CDOs of dodgy provenance see a floor placed under their asset values? Yes. The Psalmist also stated the sun shines on both the righteous and the unrighteous. But I believe justification exists for saving the many, even if a few do not pay the full price for their moral hazard.
Tim Myers is a Valencia resident. His column represents his own opinion, and not necessarily that of The Signal.
